Standards for offshore blowout preventers (BOPs) are being studied and updated in the wake of the forensic report on the failure of the BOP to seal the Macondo well. The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) contracted ABS and ABS Consulting to carry out a study of industry practices related to BOP maintenance, inspection and testing.

“We want to be able to determine whether or not current practices are okay for what the industry is doing now in deepwater and high-temperature, high-pressure wells,” Bret Montaruli, ABS vice president, offshore technology, told Hart Energy E&P Online. “The study will include recommendations for what needs to be changed to attain best practices.”

The contract was awarded in October 2011 to ABS. The class society then signed up ABS Consulting to work on the study.

“Our role is to provide a report with recommendations to BSEE with the idea that these may be used by BSEE to change or update requirements for maintenance, inspection and testing. At this point, we are gathering data,” he explained.

The study has three distinct phases. The first phase is data collection, compilation and analysis. Data is being collected from study participants.

The second phase consists of a series of risk and reliability analyses -- failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA). There also will be a review of the participants’ management systems and procedures for BOP maintenance, inspection and testing. During this phase, the analyses will be used to evaluate the impact of maintenance and inspection strategies.

The third phase is the compilation of the final report, including recommendations.

“We’re looking at real case studies on where ‘this operator’ was using ‘this drilling contractor’ with ‘this OEM’s equipment’ to drill ‘this well,’” Montaruli noted. Following the FMECAs, “ABS will carry out RAM (reliability, availability and maintainability) studies. From all those studies, we will develop a report for BSEE, looking at current industry practices.”

According to Montaruli, the study does not get into the design of the equipment itself. ABS has two people managing the process within the ABS technical organization. It also is using a number of outside groups. ABS Consulting was contracted for data gathering and risk studies. The rest of the input is coming from industry, a contribution Montaruli is not surprised to see.

“We’ve always had the participation of the industry,” he said. “We couldn’t have done what we’ve done over the past 30 years without industry participation. When you have something like Macondo happen, of course, there’s always a surge in interest because all parties want to avoid accidents.”

Standards and requirements have grown with the industry. Any time a serious incident has occurred, there has been an improvement in operational safety. As an example, Montaruli pointed to the sinking of the Ocean Ranger semisubmersible offshore Newfoundland in 1982 with 84 crew members on board.

“I was involved in the rewriting of the ballast system requirements after the Ocean Ranger,” Montaruli said. “There was a big change in IMO standards. Following that, everybody else’s rules for ballast systems for semisubmersibles changed. That safety improvement was a direct result of the Ocean Ranger incident. “Every time there is a major accident, there is major action. People take a step back and look at what went wrong. Then they try to address the requirements that will help to improve the safety so that it lessens the likelihood of it happening again,” he emphasized.

“I think you see that today post-Macondo. API and other organizations are redoing their requirements based on what was learned from Macondo. It is not only BSEE looking at procedures, he said. “We’re also participating with API on its 16 series and RP 53. There are a number of things that are ongoing that may impact design of well control equipment and systems. We’re trying to look at it from all sides and participate wherever we can use our experience.”

In March 2011, following the Deepwater Horizon accident, ABS reissued its enhanced Guide for the Classification of Drilling Systems (CDS), which provides a comprehensive approach to classing offshore drilling systems and the associated support systems.

“The CDS guide covers the whole drilling package. The update last year was regarding well control, and it addressed BOPs and control systems,” he noted.

The document refers to other applicable ABS rules and guides as well as relevant industry codes and standards for systems, subsystems, equipment or components from the wellhead to the top of the derrick.

“This was a significant change in that we have moved from a component-based approach to a systems-based approach in terms of design reviews and rule requirements,” he added.

And, the system continues to function. In mid-January 2012, for example, a termination notice was filed on a contract with an ultradeepwater drillship that did not pass acceptance tests.

“There are always requirements for ongoing surveys during the life of the unit to make sure it continues to meet the inspection, class and testing requirements for that BOP,” he pointed out. “Any time a test fails, whether it is required by ABS, an administrative Flag State or other regulatory body, we want to know what happened and why it failed. That’s how safety improves. The class requirements we have in place now have grown significantly as the industry has grown, Montaruli said.

And improvements will continue. “You will see Flag States, coastal states, standards organizations, international regulatory bodies and class societies issuing updated and new requirements and recommended practices over the next few years as a result of the Macondo accident,” he concluded.

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