Russia’s decision in late September to deploy forces into Syria will prolong the civil war and perhaps extend Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s bloody tenure in office. However, it may only delay the day of reckoning, as the Syrian military struggles to preserve control over roughly 20% of the country’s territory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has deployed military advisors and trainers to provide expertise to Syrian forces on matters including command and control, intelligence, logistics and use of Russian weapons systems, as well as Russian-piloted aircraft to participate directly in ground strikes.

Russian “volunteers” may soon begin appearing in frontline ground units as well if these measures prove insufficient.

If the U.S. military effort in Iraq is any indication, however, Russia’s support will prove indecisive to the Syrian military. Despite thousands of U.S. air sorties and about 3,500 U.S. military advisors providing similar support, Iraqi ground forces have lost control of major cities just an hour’s drive outside the capital.

U.S. airpower is notably constrained by a commitment to discriminate between Islamic State, Sunni tribal and civilian targets to avoid further inflaming the insurgency in Iraq.

Russia, in contrast, is attacking moderate opposition forces along with radical Islamists under the pretext of fighting “terrorism.” It undoubtedly will provoke further ire from neighboring countries, whose governments will press the U.S. to up the ante and will act unilaterally if it does not. Indiscriminate bombings are counterproductive to Russia’s broader goal of improving its relations with the region and could result in retaliation against its own forces.

These considerations should cause the Russian military to exercise greater discretion than its Syrian counterpart has to date, as well as to urge the latter to do the same. The greater capabilities of Russia’s intelligence and accuracy of its airpower should enable it to do so.

Even if Russian forces were inclined to do this, however, the Syrian military has already inflicted too much damage under Assad’s leadership. His existence is the insurgency’s core motivating and unifying force. Putin may realize this in time to save the Syrian state and could attempt to prevent its collapse by helping to orchestrate Assad’s demise via Syrian military officers eager to stave off the radical Sunni Islamist hordes.

A coup might be the most surgical way to keep the Syrian state intact, provided a Syrian general could be identified who is capable of holding the Syrian military together and has not been implicated in egregious human rights violations. That leader might have some chance of fracturing the insurgency by persuading the relative moderates to break from the radical Islamists and side with the new regime, in return for the promise of leadership seats under the new power structure.

Russia is attacking moderate opposition forces along with radical Islamists under the pretext of fighting terrorism.

Russia’s placement of advisors alongside senior Syrian military officers should provide excellent intelligence to maximize the chances of success of such a high-stakes decision.

The alternative is a further escalation by all sides. President Obama’s forbearance in Ukraine is less likely to be matched in Syria—he has been humiliated by an embarrassingly ineffectual effort to train and equip moderate Syrian rebels while the slaughter and refugee crisis expands. His administration will likely decide in the coming weeks that Russia has less to lose in Syria than Ukraine and will act accordingly.

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