Observant people are a company's most important asset in preventing a terrorist attack on a corporate installation.

The age of terrorism has reared its ugly head in the United States. Although many experts have been expecting these events for some time, they have been unthinkable to most.
Now is the time to prevent future attacks and protect facilities that will assist the impending war effort. The ultimate challenge will be to thwart potential retaliation attacks.
The first point to realize in any security plan is that terrorists and common criminals alike are not necessarily intent on penetrating or destroying your particular facility. They are intent on assaulting a facility. One must understand that terrorist actions generally are not personal. They are objective. Terrorists want to find a facility in which security weaknesses ensure a successful operation. Criminals want to avoid being arrested, so they too look for a weakened facility.
The best way to avoid becoming a victim is to strengthen your facility and become what experts refer to as a "hard target." The best way to ensure safety is to hire trained experts with knowledge in more than just security. Hire experts with military backgrounds in conducting small unit attacks such as Special Operations. And remember, the best way to catch a thief is to think like one.
The second point to consider when developing a security plan is that your facility is one of many being looked at in the "targeting phase" of any terrorist or criminal operation. This is the phase in which the attacker begins to evaluate which facilities are the most vulnerable and which will provide the most success with the least amount of risk.
Making your facility a hard target is similar to the old adage about the bear: "One doesn't have to be faster than the bear. He only has to be faster than his buddy." This in layman's terms is the principle that applies to deterring attacks.
The third and probably most imperative point to remember is this: Nothing happens without surveillance. No matter what type of crime takes place, the criminal has observed his attack location. Less organized criminals may have only spent 5 or 10 minutes watching their location, but nevertheless, they have prepared in some way. Human survival instincts dictate that the predator will ensure he has the advantage. Even great white sharks generally attack from behind because they want that advantage.
Terrorists want to ensure success, so they will dedicate a large amount of time to surveillance of a potential target. This is when they are most vulnerable and the possibility of thwarting their attack is the greatest. Herein lies the best defense against terrorism and crime. The best defense and the most cost-effective way to deter attacks is training. The ultimate weapon against terrorism and crime is not expensive cameras and heavily armed guards.
Knowledge is the ultimate weapon.
Training staff members - from the receptionist to the chief executive officer - about terrorism and providing them with an understanding of attacks will enable them to recognize people out of place and situations that warrant further investigation. This is what forces a terrorist or criminal to look elsewhere. Once a potential intruder thinks someone is suspicious, he feels his chances for success have diminished greatly. The Israeli government thwarts 86% of its potential attacks through reports from average citizens. An entire article could be dedicated to the subject of training, but professional trainers are the best answer.
The biggest dilemma facing chief executive officers is, "How do we protect our facilities and remain profitable?" It is no secret that security and business do not mix. Security measures always cost money but never produce a profit. Although there are many ways to subjectively determine a large profit in terms other than financial, it is difficult to show that to the board. In terms of security expenditures, the biggest mistake most companies make is spending large amounts of money on technical equipment and low-salary, untrained guards. The most cost-effective way to provide security is to focus on procedural changes of the existing force and, once again, train the current force to be more effective.
Hardening a facility does not have to be a huge cost either. Some facilities can be secure without spending great sums of money. Security measures can be enhanced through beautification measures such as landscaping. A facility can be reinforced without looking like a fortress. New cameras and motion systems may not be necessary if the existing systems are shifted to a more effective position. When developing a plan, remember nothing happens without surveillance.
Developing ways to ensure that access measures and security procedures are not easily observed can greatly reduce the success of a terrorist, thus forcing the terrorist to search for another target. Unfortunately, most facility security plans are designed to observe an attack in progress and react instead of prevent one. This is much like the thought process of self-defense and firearms training. They are good skills to have but far less effective than avoiding a dangerous situation in the first place.
As in our previous article, "Avoid Terrorist Confrontations" (Hart's E&P, April 2001, p. 9), the keywords "hard target" should be applied to facility security (Table 1).
Hold monthly meetings to discuss observations. Meetings should include every department head and middle managers as well. All managers should encourage employees to report anything out of the ordinary so it can be brought up at the monthly meeting. For example, a person working on the west side of the building may have observed a red car parked outside for 10 minutes on 2 consecutive days. After that, it was not seen, so the employee thought nothing of it. However, the car may have moved to the east side of the building, where it was seen by another employee but deemed insignificant. If these two seemingly minor events were reported in a meeting, suddenly the combination of the two reports would become very significant.
Arrange access to form a serpentine. A serpentine should be established to prevent a car full of explosives from crashing through the gate and exploding on impact with the building. This doesn't have to be unsightly. It can be made of solid trees planted in a pattern or small trees with pipe behind them. It could be something as extravagant as fountains and statues placed properly. One is limited only by imagination. Remember to make it large enough to accommodate tractor-trailers and other transport vehicles.
Reduce access to sensitive areas and key personnel. Everybody tends to follow this rule of thumb but forgets what is sensitive. To the terrorist, generators, power grids and production valves are just as sensitive as the control room and the senior executive's office.
Develop a pass system for access and parking. Have a simple, inexpensive and user-friendly pass system for all employees. Use letters or some other symbol to establish what areas a person is authorized to be in. The badge should not say specifically what areas (control room, for example). This will prevent an intruder from obtaining knowledge about which badge he needs. A coded system also might uncover a person wearing a stolen badge. Make sure the badge system is not elaborate so it can be changed periodically at random. Do not title reserved parking spaces. Ensure passes are in car windows, and have the key leaders rotate where they park so the chief executive officer spot is not always the same.
Train staff to recognize potential problems. By providing staff with the training to recognize and report suspicious circumstances, you increase your guard force by the number of employees at your facility without increasing payroll by a penny. Employees in some countries fear reprisal from attackers if they provide information. This can be overcome with a good system of anonymous notification and strong incentives.
Act on information provided by staff, no matter how insignificant it appears. Information should be readily passed to security personnel. What does it hurt to have a guard check on something? A good guard will welcome the opportunity to investigate. There will be people who report things that are obviously not worth checking, but check anyway. The time wasted is far less significant than the aftermath of an attack or other incident. And even the most disciplined security personnel can not watch monitors 8 hours a day and remain attentive. It will do them good to walk around and check on potential problems.
Randomly patrol the facility. Every security person in the world is taught to vary the times of their patrols, and some are taught to vary direction. However, the most important piece of advice is to vary the distance and duration of the patrol. An intruder doesn't care when you leave or in which direction you go. He will time his movements based on where a guard goes and how long it takes him to return. Varying the duration of a patrol greatly increases the potential for discovery.
Gain the advantage through lighting. Use lights with motion sensors to cover areas such as wood lines or jungle that may provide concealment. No matter how much field is cleared around a facility, an observer will watch from the wood line. Attach a beacon to the top so others can identify a potential intrusion point. Make sure the sensors are high enough to prevent the detection of small animals. If the sensors come on all the time, people will become complacent. A horn triggered by the sensor also may be effective.
Establish random pass checks and a system to immediately report stolen or lost badges. Make sure employees understand there will be no reprisals for reporting a lost or stolen badge. Security should make spot checks of badges to ensure the badge is authentic and the badge holder has additional identification.
Take precautions to limit observation of access procedures and recognize stand-off weapons positions. By using landscape and other materials, the procedures used to gain access can be masked. This prevents a potential intruder from discovering what items he may need to access a facility. Stand-off weapons positions are places where sniper attacks and rocket-propelled grenades can be employed without entering the facility. Lighting of these areas and the concealment of facility activities through the use of fencing, landscape or other materials can greatly reduce the possibility of these types of attack. When possible, cameras should be focused on stand-off positions.
Established properly, security measures can be cost-effective, pleasing to the eye and user-friendly. The best security plan is one that protects people and the facility and pleases the board.

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