Engineers are surprised and frustrated when a new product or technology, which has clear benefits, is not readily accepted, or is even rejected, by its users. While there are several reasons why this can happen, by far the most difficult to predict and address are the so-called "people issues." This article will look at three case studies to examine different aspects of this problem.

Case 1: Big Brother

The first case study demonstrates the effect of the phenomenon known as Big Brother. Big Brother was the institution in George Orwell's novel 1984 that manipulated and controlled the thoughts and actions of the people it governed. In modern society it is applied to governmental and corporate bodies that find ways to disempower their citizens or employees so as to maintain their power and promote their agendas. Because technology often has a disempowering consequence, it can be viewed as a tool of Big Brother, and resistance to it is a natural human response.

In the 1980s, several major operators developed the ability to transmit real time drilling information from their rig sites to a central site control room. These rooms analyzed the data using drilling experts, sophisticated simulators and data analysis software not available on the rig. Based on the analysis of the real time information, the control room instructed the rig site as to how to best proceed.

The technology - although costly and finicky in this pre-Internet age - was effective. Several studies attested to the substantial financial gains made when employing such systems. Yet only one relatively modest implementation is still in operation today. Although there were several reasons for this mass extinction, the rig crew perception of this technology as a tool of Big Brother was undoubtedly a major component. During a 2001 SPE Applied Technology Workshop that looked at this technology, there were reports of satellite cables being cut, cameras disabled, data doctored, rig site personnel suffering nervous breakdowns, and naked, active hostility. This resistance, coupled with the cost of maintaining the communications equipment and control rooms, caused the control rooms' often-spectacular demise.
The benefit of hindsight shows these failures to be an inevitable result of the ignorance of people issues surrounding Big Brother. Operators in the office simply saw the control rooms as a natural extension of their command-and-control structure. This ignored the culture of the rig site, where personnel rightly believed they were traditionally empowered to make nearly all tactical decisions and many strategic decisions. The perception at the rig site was that these decisions were being taken away from them. Since these decisions affected their financial rewards, their personal safety and their pride, the technology attacked their values in several dimensions at a fundamental level.

Most second-generation control rooms seriously attempt to take this culture into account, acknowledging the need to preserve rig site empowerment.

Case 2: Subtle, destructive

The first example was (in hindsight) a clear case of ignorance and insensitivity. But the following example is not obvious. In fact, empowerment of drilling personnel was utmost in the minds of the implementers.
And yet it still failed.

In the late 1980s, the author led a project to develop a software program to optimize rate of penetration (ROP) as an addition to a standalone rig-site monitoring system. To run the software, the rotary speed was set, and then weight on the bit was drilled off. The instantaneous rate of penetration as a function of weight was recorded. This process was repeated for three different rotary speeds. The data was plotted on graphs. From these graphs the most efficient weight on bit and rotary speed was selected.

Traditionally, this procedure was run manually and the graphs manually plotted. Because of the tedium involved in preparation and processing of the data, it was often not performed. The software program automated much of the process and removed the calculation tedium.

The operator sponsoring the project and our development team both perceived this to be not only a productivity tool but also a rig empowerment tool that would certainly be welcomed by rig site personnel.
The software had some initial glitches but became reliable and functional. In 50% of the cases, the graphs were inconclusive or uninterpretable. However, in the other 50% of the cases, the recommendations made by the tool increased the ROP. Overall, rotating hours were reduced by 20%.

In spite of this success, resistance by drillers and rig superintendents to the use of the software grew. The reasons given were various: the software was too finicky to use; the results showed what they already knew anyway; it took too much time to run the test. Paradoxically, drilling curves showed they were breaking penetration records everywhere. Nonetheless, when intense engineering oversight stopped, use of the tool declined. Eventually it was abandoned, and performance declined and became more variable.

What went wrong? This is not at all obvious, but consider these factors:

• Half of the time the software displayed inconclusive results. Drillers traditionally expect decisiveness and 100% accuracy. This was totally the wrong way to present inconclusive information.
• A drilling contractor working on day rate will not necessarily perceive an increase of ROP to be a priority. Instead, he will focus on safe and effective operation of the drilling equipment and crew, and avoiding non-productive time. So, adding substantial weight on bit that could potentially lead to bit failure would be perceived as a serious error, despite assurances from the operator that the risk was acceptable.
• The drillers were accustomed to the company man or tool pusher setting operating limits and were uncomfortable changing the parameters frequently. The discomfort was increased by the fact that the testing showed that the drill rate was maximized with bit loads that lay outside the previous practices.
• Graphical analysis is not part of a driller's usual decision-making process or skill set.
These factors suggest a disconnect between the technology and the expectations of those using it. The resistance encountered was the result of drillers essentially saying, "This is not my job!"

Case 3: Help the driller

A mistake commonly made in introducing new technology is misunderstanding how to apply the concepts of "benefit" and "ease of use." The relevant question to ask is: "Will the actual user perceive that the technology is both beneficial to him and easy to use?" Simply put, does the user believe the gain worth the pain? Those developers that understand this distinction will often succeed. Those that don't rarely succeed and rarely understand why they don't succeed.

The networked drilling control systems used on today's advanced fleet of drillships, semisubmersibles and platforms are examples of how this issue is being addressed correctly. With over 3,000 data points to monitor or control, it is certainly sophisticated technology. Monitoring and controlling machinery using touch screens, joysticks, and controls-on-glass takes a new kind of thinking and considerable training.

One would expect that this would take drillers way out of their comfort zone and frustrate the adoption of the technology. But that is not what is happening. It is being rapidly and successfully adopted.
To understand why, look at Figure 1. It shows a 1941 driller. Sure, it's idealized: his shirt is ironed and it isn't raining. Nonetheless, the picture does capture the essence of ergonomically effective drilling. His focus is on the drilling operation, with controls and instrumentation just off of line-of-sight.
Now look at Figure 2. It shows the drilling console on the Glomar Jack Ryan. Today's networked control systems are designed with this same spirit in mind. Even though the equipment being controlled is many times more complex, the workstations allow the driller to focus on the rig floor operation just like the 1941 driller. This is possible because the technology is managing the complexity of machine operation. This frees the driller to focus on running a safe and efficient drilling operation, which he rightly perceives to be his essential job. From his point of view, this is fundamentally worthwhile.

Because the drillers (not the control system designers or the rig managers) perceive that these systems are essential tools to do their job effectively, while being easy and enjoyable to use, they readily adopt this complex technology.

Conclusion

Although each case study has something unique to teach, there are nonetheless common threads:
• It is essential to establish a clear need for the change promised by the technology, perceived by all;
• The technology should be compatible with established cultures and work processes; and
• The actual user must perceive personal benefit, even enjoyment, from the technology.
Of course, a non-conforming technology can be forced on a culture through command-and-control and negative reinforcement ("my way or the highway"). This requires a sustained management effort involving time and money. Only the most significant technology will warrant such attention. More likely, the technology will be abandoned to await the time when either it or the work processes and culture change to be compatible with each other.

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